

recognition does the job: you're back in the Forties, or maybe the Fifties. Manchester doesn't have to sweat to make his point, to immanentize the record: not as hard, at any rate, as did John Dos Passos, whose *U.S.A.*, with its "Camera Eye," "Newsreel," and potted biographies (*The Glory and the Dream* has them, too—"Portraits of Americans," done in proletarian style, of Eleanor Roosevelt, Walter Reuther, Marilyn Monroe, etc.), apparently served Manchester as a model during the fabrication of his jitney epic. The most inane or inconsequential tidbits work double-time to suggest the quintessence of any particular year (for every year, like the latest chariot from Detroit, has perforce its own *je ne sais quoi*); thus 1971 was "a rough year for tradition," with Rolls Royce in receivership, a bomb in the boys' room in the U.S. Senate, and botulism in the Bon Vivant soup cans. Manchester evokes historical periods much as Theodore Dreiser was wont to evoke a hotel or a city street: by stringing item after item after item. Like Dreiser, he simply assumes that a lot of anything adds up to a whole lot.

The title of this silly book is taken from Wordsworth's query:

*Whither is fled the visionary gleam?
Where is it now, the glory and the dream?*

Where is it now, indeed! Entombed in the prose of those 52 x 40 back issues of *Time* magazine, that's where—and in the banal vision of William Manchester's latest bestseller. □

National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union

By Antony C. Sutton

Arlington, 228 pp., \$7.95

Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution

By Antony C. Sutton

Arlington, 283 pp., \$8.95

YANKEE TRADERS

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With detente in a blessed turmoil and IBM recently nabbing nine German spies stealing computer technology allegedly for the KGB, here are two instructive studies as timely as today's

headlines. They deserve wide readership. Both books document how extensively America already has contributed to building the Soviet state. In *Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution*, Hoover Institution scholar Antony Sutton argues that the Communists rule Russia not in spite of, but more because of, American (and European) monopoly capitalists who bankrolled and bolstered the shaky Bolsheviks from 1917 on. In *National Suicide*, the author contends, with only a trace of hyperbole, that "there is no such thing as Soviet technology." What there is is Western technology which has been given to, sold to, bought, borrowed, or stolen by the Soviets. In their hands, this techno-treasure "has built the Free World an enemy of the first order."

WHILE THIS is not exactly a shattering revelation, Sutton's alarming litany of America's historical shuttling between greed and giveaway is an eye-opener. Using now-declassified U.S. Government files, surprisingly revealing Soviet data (especially maritime data), and some judiciously spaded-up history, Sutton shows how emissaries from interlocked factions of famous American dynastic fortunes (Morgan, Rockefeller, Guggenheim, Whitney, Du Pont) invested shadowy millions in the faltering Bolsheviks and not too overhandedly connived to sell the regime's "virtues" to Washington. Their reasons for financing the anti-plutocrats were Russia's vast, untapped natural resources and potential industrial needs.

America's monopoly capitalists, he submits, found perfect business bedfellows in the power-hungry Bolsheviks, who were desperate enough to barter Russia's resources for credits and hard currency. Unlike America's "laissez-faire entrepreneurs," our pillars of plutocracy shared basic aims with social revolutionaries (and aided them in China, Mexico, and Panama as well as Russia). These men, says Sutton, were internationalist, imperialist, and highly centralized decisionmakers. In terms of cynical, selfish Realpolitik, the bankers and industrialists had the right idea in their "unholy alliance": the inherent weaknesses of socialist central planning and Bolshevik dependence on Western capital would prevent Russia from becoming a serious competitor and keep her "a captive market and technical colony."

What began as massive and often

secret aid quickly developed into brisk trade, with Western—largely American—technology and managerial skills helping to nudge Russia into an industrial age. We developed the first Five Year Plans—and sold them the machinery to try to make them come true. Industry and science followed suit, willingly exporting technological treasure to a country whose leaders still preach that everything can be converted into weapons to fight capitalism. Lenin predicted that we would sell the Communists the rope to hang us; we have. Sutton demonstrates rather frighteningly how Soviet industrialization, especially since WW II, has been synonymous with Soviet militarization. Ships and trucks ferrying Russian copies of Western armaments into Hainan and down the Ho Chi Minh Trail might as well have been stamped "Made in U.S.A."

One could go on. Sutton does, relying on Soviet data because much critical U.S. trade information is *still* classified (some as far back as 1919!), to show how "peaceful trade" turns into military advantage. Turnkey "truck" and "tractor" plants can easily produce tanks and transport vehicles. The latest in U.S. precision ball-bearing manufacturing equipment may go into missiles, aviation, artillery systems. Advanced computers (which the USSR seriously lacks, says Sutton, and "promises" not to use militarily) are another major factor in building a global threat that "costs the American taxpayer \$80 billion a year to counter." And there is "clear, overwhelming" evidence that "the Soviets have used American technology to kill Americans and their allies"—some 100,000 in Korea and Vietnam by Sutton's tally.

A PEACEFUL trade advocate might well argue that technology, as such, is a free, world commodity—as with (ideally) scientific and medical knowledge. Or that if we don't sell it to the Russians, our European competitors will garner the gold. Sutton's reply is that U.S. technology is generally the most advanced and sought after and that, for political as well as economic reasons, the Soviets do not possess the innovative push or R&D resources to match our standards. Small wonder that the German spies were rifling IBM for the latest goodies. Our peaceful traders might ponder these two books to good advantage. □